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General Irvin McDowell - 1st Bull Run/1st Manassas
Report of Brigadier General Irvin McDowell
Headquarters Department Northeastern Virginia, Arlington, VA, August 4, 1861
Colonel:
I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the 21st of July, near
Manassas, Va. It has been delayed till this time from the inability of the subordinate
commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.
In my communication to you of the 20th ultimo, I stated it as my intention to move that
afternoon and drive the enemy from the east side of Bull Run, so as to enable the
engineers to make a sufficiently accurate reconnaissance to justify our future movements.
Later in the day they had obtained enough information of the passages across the stream
to dispense with this reconnaissance, and it was decided to move without further delay.
It had been my intention to move the several columns out on the road a few miles on the
evening of the 20th, so that they would have a shorter march in the morning; but I
deferred to those who had the greatest distance to go, and who preferred starting early in
the morning and making but one move.
On the evening of the 20th ultimo my command was mostly at or near Centreville. The
enemy was at or near Manassas, distant from Centreville about seven miles to the
southwest. Centreville is a village of a few houses, mostly on the west side of a ridge
running nearly north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas Junction runs
along this ridge, and crosses Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The
Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge through the
village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between
the crossings from northwest to southeast.
The First Division (Tyler's) was stationed as follows: One brigade on the north side of the
Warrenton turnpike and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge; two brigades on the
same road and a mile and a half in advance to the west of the ridge; and one brigade on
the road from Centreville to Manassas where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford,
where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th ultimo.
The Second Division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of
Centreville.
The Third Division (Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the old Braddock road, which
comes into Centreville from the southeast about a mile and a half from the village.
The Fifth Division (Miles') was on the same road with the Third Division, and between it
and Centreville.
A map, which is herewith, marked A, will show these positions better than I describe them.
Friday night a train of subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents were ordered to
be issued to the command, and the men required to have three days rations in their
haversacks. (See appendix herewith, marked B.)
Saturday orders (copy herewith, marked c) were issued for the available force to march.
As reported to you in my letter of the 19th ultimo, my personal reconnaissance of the
roads to the south had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of
turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th at Blackburn's Ford
showed he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss,
and if we did, that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was
not desired.
Our information was that the stone bridge over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull
Run to the west of Centreville was mined, defended by a battery in position, and the road
on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abatis. The alternative was, therefore, to
turn the extreme left of his position.
Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the
bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was
therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and, after crossing, to get behind
the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton
road east of the bridge to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville,
and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and
those in the Valley of Virginia before Winchester, which had been held in check by
Major-General Patterson.
Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on the Warrenton
road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, moving
after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to the right and north,
and move by a wood road around to the upper ford, and then turn south and get behind
the enemy; Colonel Heintzelman's division to follow Hunter's as far as the turning-off place
to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by
Hunter's division; the Fifth Division (Miles') to be in reserve on the Centreville ridge.
I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville along
this ridge, fearing that, whilst we should be in force to the front and endeavoring to turn
the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road. For if he should
once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the
foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and
destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to
extemporize some field works to strengthen the position.
The Fourth Division (Runyon's) had not been brought to the front farther than to guard
our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His
advanced regiment was about seven miles in rear of Centreville.
The divisions were ordered to march at 2.30 o'clock a.m., so as to arrive on the ground
early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at this season. There
was delay in the First Division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions
were, in consequence, between two and three hours behind the time appointed - a great
misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to
the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the
stream being oblique to the road and we having the obtuse angle on our side.
General Tyler commenced with his artillery at 6.30 a.m., but the enemy did not reply, and
after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he
did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing
several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve,
in case we should have to send any troops back to re-enforce Miles' division. The other
brigades moved forward as directed in the general order.
On reaching the ford at Sudley Springs, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's
division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to
drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the
immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the
column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the
heads of regiments to break from the column, and come for-ward separately as fast as
possible.
Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by
a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to
direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front
of him to attack the division which had crossed over.
The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley Springs south, and
over which Burnside's brigade marched, was, for about a mile from the ford, thickly
wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country was
divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the ford the country on both sides of
the road is open, and for nearly a mile farther large rolling fields extend down to the
Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle, through the valley of a
small water-course, a tributary of Bull Run.
Shortly after the leading regiment of the First Brigade reached this open space, and whilst
the others and the Second Brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy
opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following it up with infantry.
The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without
support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly
afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade and a regiment detached from
Heintzelman's division to the left forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's
and Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division to cross from their position on the Warrenton road.
These drove the right of the enemy (understood to have been commanded by
Beauregard) from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the
road, and across it, up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on,
Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream and up the road beyond.
Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road down which our troops had
marched from Sudley Springs, is a hill with a farm house on it. Behind this hill the enemy
had early in the day some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from
this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge or table land. The hottest part of the
contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it.
The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Willcox's and Howard's brigades on
the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and
Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the
center and up the road, whilst Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking
the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island Battery of Burnside's brigade also
participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was
understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston.
Ricketts' battery, which did such effective service and played so brilliant a part in this
contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object
of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded (our officers mistaking one of his
regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it) in
disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by
different corps in succession and driven back, and the guns taken by hand (the horses
being killed) and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse
was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and
all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half,
and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession from the stone
bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abatis across
the road to allow our re-enforcements (Schenck's brigade and Ayres' battery) to join us.
The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been fighting since
10.30 o'clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The men had
been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such
things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone
over was not more than 9½ miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out
to them the day before, many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on
the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much
severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two
attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and
had many men out of the ranks.
It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid from the railroad train
(understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army).
They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our
men, which caused them to break and retire down the hill-side. This soon degenerated
into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even
beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone
moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained itself until our
men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position
we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating groups, and they
seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout,
and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so
faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes,
and that nothing remained on that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent,
I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form a line,
and offer the appearance, at least, of organization and force.
They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel
Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in
small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was
lost.
Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move forward and protect
this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was
ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road.
By referring to the general order it will be seen that while the operations were to go on in
front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by the brigade (Richardson's)
stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the
artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It
succeeded in deceiving the enemy for considerable time and in keeping in check a part of
his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive.
At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, much firing, and columns
of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole
stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed.
After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's brigades, I
repaired to Richardson's, and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the
holding of the road from Manassas, by Blackburn's Ford, to Centreville, on the march,
under orders from the division commander, for Centreville. I immediately halted it, and
ordered it to take up the best line of defense across the ridge that their then position
admitted of; and subsequently, taking in person the command of this part of the Army, I
caused such disposition of the forces, which had been added to by the First and Second
New Jersey and the De Kalb Regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve before going
forward, as would best serve to check the enemy.
The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville
to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub Run, and, owing to the
road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery
could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the
horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to
escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the
road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances
carrying the wounded.
By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville ridge, and it became a
question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our
artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally
abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter
disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the Army, seemed to all
who were near enough to be consulted - division and brigade commanders and staff - to
admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position at Blackburn's Ford
was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left.
On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to
me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in
from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still
continuing and hurrying them along.
At - ? O'clock the rear guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, covering the retreat, which was
effected during the night and next morning. The troops at Fairfax Station, leaving by the
cars, took with them the bulk of the supplies which had been sent there. My
aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, staid at Fairfax Court-House till late in the morning, to
see that the stragglers and weary and worn-out soldiers were not left behind.
I transmit herewith the reports of the several division and brigade commanders, to which I
refer for the conduct of particular regiments and corps, and a consolidated return of the
killed, wounded, and missing, marked D. From the latter it will be seen that our killed
amounted to 19 officers and 462 non-commissioned officers and privates, and our
wounded to 64 officers and 947 non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the
wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled
from further service under 1,000.
The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having
fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington; many of the Zouaves to New York. In
one brigade the number originally reported at 616 was yesterday reduced to 174. These
reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be made.
Of course nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer of their forces,
coming from them with a flag, admitted 1,800 killed and wounded, and other information
shows this to be much under the true number.
The officer commanding the Eleventh New York (Zouaves) and Colonel Heintzelman say
that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many there reported among the
casualties have absented themselves since their return, and have gone to New York.
Among the missing are reported many of our surgeons, who remained in attendance on
our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.
The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no credit in their
conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior in numbers, who had but a
short distance to march, and who acted on his own ground on the defensive, and always
under cover, whilst our men were of necessity out on the open fields, should not prevent
full credit being given to those officers and corps whose services merited success if they
did not attain it.
To avoid repetition I will only mention here the names of those not embraced in the
reports of division and brigade commanders. I beg to refer to their reports for the names
of those serving under their immediate orders, desiring that on this subject of persons,
&c., they be considered as part of my own.
I claim credit for the officers of my staff and for those acting as such during the day. They
did everything in their power, exposing themselves freely when required, and doing all
that men could do, communicating orders, guiding the columns, exhorting the troops,
rallying them when broken, and providing for them the best the circumstances admitted.
They are as follows:
First Lieut. H. W. Kingsbury, Fifth Artillery, A, D.C.
Maj. Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia, volunteer A.D.C. Maj. James S. Wadsworth, New
York Militia, volunteer A.D.C.
The latter (who does me the honor to be on my personal staff) had a horse shot under
him in the hottest of the fight.
Capt. James B. Fry, assistant adjutant-general.
Capt. O. H. Tillinghast, assistant quartermaster, who discharged alone the important and
burdensome duties of his department with the Army, and who was mortally wounded whilst
acting with the artillery, to which he formerly belonged, and in which he was deeply
interested.
Capt. H. F. Clarke, Subsistence Department, chief of subsistence department.
Major Myer, Signal Officer, and Maj. Malcolm McDowell, who acted as aides.
Surg. W. S. King and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, Medical Department.
Maj. J. G. Barnard, Engineer, and senior of his department with the Army, who gave me
most important aid.
First Lieut. Fred. E. Prime, Engineer.
Capt. A. W. Whipple, First Lieut. H. L. Abbot, and Second Lieut. H. S. Putnam,
Topographical Engineers.
Maj. W. F. Barry, Fifth Artillery, chief of artillery.
Lieut. Geo. C. Strong, ordnance officer.
Maj. W. H. Wood, Seventeenth Infantry, acting inspector-general.
Second Lieut. Guy V. Henry, who joined me on the field, and was of service as an
aide-de-camp.
The following officers commanded divisions and brigades, and in the several places their
duty called them did most effective service and behaved in the most gallant manner:
Brigadier-General Tyler, Connecticut Volunteers.
Col. David Hunter, Third Cavalry, severely wounded at the head of his division.
Col. S. P. Heintzelman, Seventeenth Infantry, wounded in the arm while leading his
division into action on the hill.
Brigadier-General Schenck, Ohio Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, First Division.
Col. E. D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, commanding First Brigade, First Division.
Col. W. B. Franklin, Twelfth Infantry, First Brigade, Third Division.
Col. W. T. Sherman, Thirteenth Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, First Division.
Col. Andrew Porter, Sixteenth Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.
Col. A. E. Burnside, Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Second
Division.
Col. O. B. Willcox, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division, who
was wounded and taken prisoner whilst on the hill in the hottest of the fight.
Col. O. O. Howard, Maine Volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division.
Col. I. B. Richardson, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Fourth Brigade, First Division.
Colonel Blenker, New York Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Fifth Division.
Colonel Davies, New York Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Fifth Division.
As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for, some explanation of the causes,
as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be
considered out of place if I refer, in a few words, to the immediate antecedents of the
battle.
When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the
plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into
effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday).
Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the
administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments,
owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come
across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my ever
seeing them and without having been together before in a brigade.
The sending re-enforcements to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a
further and unavoidable cause of delay.
Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me
in every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for
the trains and for the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time
appointed to move.
I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became
great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th
ultimo. When I did set out on the 16th I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence, but I
went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me.
The trains thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and
wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and
was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to
make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday.
I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished
them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th,
and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th instead of
the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court-House beyond Germantown to urge
them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only
come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and one-half miles farther
to Centreville, in all a march of twelve and one-half miles; but the men were foot-weary,
not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot,
caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid
ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in
condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the lead of "light marching
order."
We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the Fifth Division (Miles') and
Richardson's brigade on the left at Blackburn's Ford and Centreville, and Schenck's
brigade of Tyler's division on the left of the road near the stone bridge, not participating in
the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely
say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he
could which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th,
and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had.
It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas I engaged not to have to
do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major
General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler, and I knew every
effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if
Johnston joined Beauregard, it should be because he would be driven in and followed by
General Patterson. But, from causes not necessary for me to refer to, even if I knew them
all, this was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in
numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and his supply of
provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court-House, Fairfax
Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must
be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from
Richmond and other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse
ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What
all this amounted to I cannot say; certainly much more than we attacked them with.
I could not, as I have said, move earlier or push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and
the best part, so considered, of my forces were three-months' volunteers, whose terms of
service were about expiring, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve
for the purpose of the expedition.
On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of Volunteers and the battery
of Volunteer Artillery of the Eighth New York Militia, whose term of service expired, insisted
on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment as pressing a request as I could pen, and the
honorable Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the
battery to remain at least five days, but in vain. They insisted on their discharge that
night. It was granted; and the next morning, when the Army moved forward into battle,
these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon.
In the next few days, day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed,
drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the Army. In other words, every day which
added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker.
In conclusion, I desire to say in reference to the events of the 21st ultimo, that the general
order for the battle to which I have referred was, with slight modifications, literally
conformed to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put
into action as before arranged, and that, up to late in the afternoon, every movement
ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before starting - that
of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it
far enough to break up and destroy the communication, and interpose between the forces
under Beauregard and those under Johnston; and could we have fought a day-yes, a few
hours-sooner, there is everything to show that we should have continued successful,
even against the odds with which we contended.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Irvin McDowell,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Lieut. Col. E. D. Townsend,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, DC
Source: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
Report of Brigadier General Irvin McDowell
Headquarters Department Northeastern Virginia, Arlington, VA, August 4, 1861
Colonel:
I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the 21st of July, near
Manassas, Va. It has been delayed till this time from the inability of the subordinate
commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.
In my communication to you of the 20th ultimo, I stated it as my intention to move that
afternoon and drive the enemy from the east side of Bull Run, so as to enable the
engineers to make a sufficiently accurate reconnaissance to justify our future movements.
Later in the day they had obtained enough information of the passages across the stream
to dispense with this reconnaissance, and it was decided to move without further delay.
It had been my intention to move the several columns out on the road a few miles on the
evening of the 20th, so that they would have a shorter march in the morning; but I
deferred to those who had the greatest distance to go, and who preferred starting early in
the morning and making but one move.
On the evening of the 20th ultimo my command was mostly at or near Centreville. The
enemy was at or near Manassas, distant from Centreville about seven miles to the
southwest. Centreville is a village of a few houses, mostly on the west side of a ridge
running nearly north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas Junction runs
along this ridge, and crosses Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The
Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge through the
village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between
the crossings from northwest to southeast.
The First Division (Tyler's) was stationed as follows: One brigade on the north side of the
Warrenton turnpike and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge; two brigades on the
same road and a mile and a half in advance to the west of the ridge; and one brigade on
the road from Centreville to Manassas where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford,
where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th ultimo.
The Second Division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of
Centreville.
The Third Division (Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the old Braddock road, which
comes into Centreville from the southeast about a mile and a half from the village.
The Fifth Division (Miles') was on the same road with the Third Division, and between it
and Centreville.
A map, which is herewith, marked A, will show these positions better than I describe them.
Friday night a train of subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents were ordered to
be issued to the command, and the men required to have three days rations in their
haversacks. (See appendix herewith, marked B.)
Saturday orders (copy herewith, marked c) were issued for the available force to march.
As reported to you in my letter of the 19th ultimo, my personal reconnaissance of the
roads to the south had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of
turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th at Blackburn's Ford
showed he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss,
and if we did, that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was
not desired.
Our information was that the stone bridge over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull
Run to the west of Centreville was mined, defended by a battery in position, and the road
on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abatis. The alternative was, therefore, to
turn the extreme left of his position.
Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the
bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was
therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and, after crossing, to get behind
the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton
road east of the bridge to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville,
and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and
those in the Valley of Virginia before Winchester, which had been held in check by
Major-General Patterson.
Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on the Warrenton
road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, moving
after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to the right and north,
and move by a wood road around to the upper ford, and then turn south and get behind
the enemy; Colonel Heintzelman's division to follow Hunter's as far as the turning-off place
to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by
Hunter's division; the Fifth Division (Miles') to be in reserve on the Centreville ridge.
I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville along
this ridge, fearing that, whilst we should be in force to the front and endeavoring to turn
the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road. For if he should
once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the
foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and
destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to
extemporize some field works to strengthen the position.
The Fourth Division (Runyon's) had not been brought to the front farther than to guard
our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His
advanced regiment was about seven miles in rear of Centreville.
The divisions were ordered to march at 2.30 o'clock a.m., so as to arrive on the ground
early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at this season. There
was delay in the First Division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions
were, in consequence, between two and three hours behind the time appointed - a great
misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to
the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the
stream being oblique to the road and we having the obtuse angle on our side.
General Tyler commenced with his artillery at 6.30 a.m., but the enemy did not reply, and
after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he
did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing
several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve,
in case we should have to send any troops back to re-enforce Miles' division. The other
brigades moved forward as directed in the general order.
On reaching the ford at Sudley Springs, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's
division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to
drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the
immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the
column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the
heads of regiments to break from the column, and come for-ward separately as fast as
possible.
Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by
a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to
direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front
of him to attack the division which had crossed over.
The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley Springs south, and
over which Burnside's brigade marched, was, for about a mile from the ford, thickly
wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country was
divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the ford the country on both sides of
the road is open, and for nearly a mile farther large rolling fields extend down to the
Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle, through the valley of a
small water-course, a tributary of Bull Run.
Shortly after the leading regiment of the First Brigade reached this open space, and whilst
the others and the Second Brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy
opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following it up with infantry.
The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without
support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly
afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade and a regiment detached from
Heintzelman's division to the left forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's
and Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division to cross from their position on the Warrenton road.
These drove the right of the enemy (understood to have been commanded by
Beauregard) from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the
road, and across it, up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on,
Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream and up the road beyond.
Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road down which our troops had
marched from Sudley Springs, is a hill with a farm house on it. Behind this hill the enemy
had early in the day some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from
this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge or table land. The hottest part of the
contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it.
The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Willcox's and Howard's brigades on
the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and
Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the
center and up the road, whilst Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking
the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island Battery of Burnside's brigade also
participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was
understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston.
Ricketts' battery, which did such effective service and played so brilliant a part in this
contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object
of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded (our officers mistaking one of his
regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it) in
disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by
different corps in succession and driven back, and the guns taken by hand (the horses
being killed) and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse
was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and
all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half,
and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession from the stone
bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abatis across
the road to allow our re-enforcements (Schenck's brigade and Ayres' battery) to join us.
The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been fighting since
10.30 o'clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The men had
been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such
things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone
over was not more than 9½ miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out
to them the day before, many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on
the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much
severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two
attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and
had many men out of the ranks.
It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid from the railroad train
(understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army).
They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our
men, which caused them to break and retire down the hill-side. This soon degenerated
into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even
beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone
moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained itself until our
men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position
we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating groups, and they
seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout,
and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so
faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes,
and that nothing remained on that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent,
I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form a line,
and offer the appearance, at least, of organization and force.
They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel
Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in
small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was
lost.
Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move forward and protect
this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was
ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road.
By referring to the general order it will be seen that while the operations were to go on in
front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by the brigade (Richardson's)
stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the
artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It
succeeded in deceiving the enemy for considerable time and in keeping in check a part of
his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive.
At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, much firing, and columns
of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole
stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed.
After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's brigades, I
repaired to Richardson's, and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the
holding of the road from Manassas, by Blackburn's Ford, to Centreville, on the march,
under orders from the division commander, for Centreville. I immediately halted it, and
ordered it to take up the best line of defense across the ridge that their then position
admitted of; and subsequently, taking in person the command of this part of the Army, I
caused such disposition of the forces, which had been added to by the First and Second
New Jersey and the De Kalb Regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve before going
forward, as would best serve to check the enemy.
The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville
to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub Run, and, owing to the
road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery
could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the
horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to
escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the
road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances
carrying the wounded.
By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville ridge, and it became a
question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our
artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally
abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter
disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the Army, seemed to all
who were near enough to be consulted - division and brigade commanders and staff - to
admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position at Blackburn's Ford
was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left.
On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to
me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in
from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still
continuing and hurrying them along.
At - ? O'clock the rear guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, covering the retreat, which was
effected during the night and next morning. The troops at Fairfax Station, leaving by the
cars, took with them the bulk of the supplies which had been sent there. My
aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, staid at Fairfax Court-House till late in the morning, to
see that the stragglers and weary and worn-out soldiers were not left behind.
I transmit herewith the reports of the several division and brigade commanders, to which I
refer for the conduct of particular regiments and corps, and a consolidated return of the
killed, wounded, and missing, marked D. From the latter it will be seen that our killed
amounted to 19 officers and 462 non-commissioned officers and privates, and our
wounded to 64 officers and 947 non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the
wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled
from further service under 1,000.
The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having
fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington; many of the Zouaves to New York. In
one brigade the number originally reported at 616 was yesterday reduced to 174. These
reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be made.
Of course nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer of their forces,
coming from them with a flag, admitted 1,800 killed and wounded, and other information
shows this to be much under the true number.
The officer commanding the Eleventh New York (Zouaves) and Colonel Heintzelman say
that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many there reported among the
casualties have absented themselves since their return, and have gone to New York.
Among the missing are reported many of our surgeons, who remained in attendance on
our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.
The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no credit in their
conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior in numbers, who had but a
short distance to march, and who acted on his own ground on the defensive, and always
under cover, whilst our men were of necessity out on the open fields, should not prevent
full credit being given to those officers and corps whose services merited success if they
did not attain it.
To avoid repetition I will only mention here the names of those not embraced in the
reports of division and brigade commanders. I beg to refer to their reports for the names
of those serving under their immediate orders, desiring that on this subject of persons,
&c., they be considered as part of my own.
I claim credit for the officers of my staff and for those acting as such during the day. They
did everything in their power, exposing themselves freely when required, and doing all
that men could do, communicating orders, guiding the columns, exhorting the troops,
rallying them when broken, and providing for them the best the circumstances admitted.
They are as follows:
First Lieut. H. W. Kingsbury, Fifth Artillery, A, D.C.
Maj. Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia, volunteer A.D.C. Maj. James S. Wadsworth, New
York Militia, volunteer A.D.C.
The latter (who does me the honor to be on my personal staff) had a horse shot under
him in the hottest of the fight.
Capt. James B. Fry, assistant adjutant-general.
Capt. O. H. Tillinghast, assistant quartermaster, who discharged alone the important and
burdensome duties of his department with the Army, and who was mortally wounded whilst
acting with the artillery, to which he formerly belonged, and in which he was deeply
interested.
Capt. H. F. Clarke, Subsistence Department, chief of subsistence department.
Major Myer, Signal Officer, and Maj. Malcolm McDowell, who acted as aides.
Surg. W. S. King and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, Medical Department.
Maj. J. G. Barnard, Engineer, and senior of his department with the Army, who gave me
most important aid.
First Lieut. Fred. E. Prime, Engineer.
Capt. A. W. Whipple, First Lieut. H. L. Abbot, and Second Lieut. H. S. Putnam,
Topographical Engineers.
Maj. W. F. Barry, Fifth Artillery, chief of artillery.
Lieut. Geo. C. Strong, ordnance officer.
Maj. W. H. Wood, Seventeenth Infantry, acting inspector-general.
Second Lieut. Guy V. Henry, who joined me on the field, and was of service as an
aide-de-camp.
The following officers commanded divisions and brigades, and in the several places their
duty called them did most effective service and behaved in the most gallant manner:
Brigadier-General Tyler, Connecticut Volunteers.
Col. David Hunter, Third Cavalry, severely wounded at the head of his division.
Col. S. P. Heintzelman, Seventeenth Infantry, wounded in the arm while leading his
division into action on the hill.
Brigadier-General Schenck, Ohio Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, First Division.
Col. E. D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, commanding First Brigade, First Division.
Col. W. B. Franklin, Twelfth Infantry, First Brigade, Third Division.
Col. W. T. Sherman, Thirteenth Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, First Division.
Col. Andrew Porter, Sixteenth Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.
Col. A. E. Burnside, Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Second
Division.
Col. O. B. Willcox, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division, who
was wounded and taken prisoner whilst on the hill in the hottest of the fight.
Col. O. O. Howard, Maine Volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division.
Col. I. B. Richardson, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Fourth Brigade, First Division.
Colonel Blenker, New York Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Fifth Division.
Colonel Davies, New York Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Fifth Division.
As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for, some explanation of the causes,
as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be
considered out of place if I refer, in a few words, to the immediate antecedents of the
battle.
When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the
plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into
effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday).
Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the
administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments,
owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come
across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my ever
seeing them and without having been together before in a brigade.
The sending re-enforcements to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a
further and unavoidable cause of delay.
Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me
in every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for
the trains and for the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time
appointed to move.
I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became
great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th
ultimo. When I did set out on the 16th I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence, but I
went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me.
The trains thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and
wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and
was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to
make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday.
I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished
them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th,
and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th instead of
the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court-House beyond Germantown to urge
them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only
come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and one-half miles farther
to Centreville, in all a march of twelve and one-half miles; but the men were foot-weary,
not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot,
caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid
ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in
condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the lead of "light marching
order."
We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the Fifth Division (Miles') and
Richardson's brigade on the left at Blackburn's Ford and Centreville, and Schenck's
brigade of Tyler's division on the left of the road near the stone bridge, not participating in
the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely
say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he
could which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th,
and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had.
It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas I engaged not to have to
do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major
General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler, and I knew every
effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if
Johnston joined Beauregard, it should be because he would be driven in and followed by
General Patterson. But, from causes not necessary for me to refer to, even if I knew them
all, this was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in
numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and his supply of
provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court-House, Fairfax
Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must
be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from
Richmond and other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse
ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What
all this amounted to I cannot say; certainly much more than we attacked them with.
I could not, as I have said, move earlier or push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and
the best part, so considered, of my forces were three-months' volunteers, whose terms of
service were about expiring, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve
for the purpose of the expedition.
On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of Volunteers and the battery
of Volunteer Artillery of the Eighth New York Militia, whose term of service expired, insisted
on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment as pressing a request as I could pen, and the
honorable Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the
battery to remain at least five days, but in vain. They insisted on their discharge that
night. It was granted; and the next morning, when the Army moved forward into battle,
these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon.
In the next few days, day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed,
drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the Army. In other words, every day which
added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker.
In conclusion, I desire to say in reference to the events of the 21st ultimo, that the general
order for the battle to which I have referred was, with slight modifications, literally
conformed to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put
into action as before arranged, and that, up to late in the afternoon, every movement
ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before starting - that
of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it
far enough to break up and destroy the communication, and interpose between the forces
under Beauregard and those under Johnston; and could we have fought a day-yes, a few
hours-sooner, there is everything to show that we should have continued successful,
even against the odds with which we contended.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Irvin McDowell,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Lieut. Col. E. D. Townsend,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, DC
Source: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies